Is RWA profitable? A comprehensive interpretation of the cryptocurrency regulatory policies outlined in the "2.6 Notice".

Author: Lawyer Xiao Sa's Team

On February 6, 2026, the People's Bank of China and eight other ministries jointly issued the "Notice on Further Preventing and Handling Risks Related to Virtual Currencies" (hereinafter referred to as the "2.6 Notice"). In one's opinion, the 2.6 Notice is actually an advanced version of the "Notice on Further Preventing and Handling Risks of Virtual Currency Trading and Speculation" (hereinafter referred to as the "9.24 Notice") issued by ten ministries in 2021.

1. The regulatory framework for virtual currencies remains largely the same as the September 24th notice, with no substantial changes except for some minor patches that require attention;

2. There is still a lack of regulatory standards regarding digital assets such as NFTs and digital artworks;

3. Relatively clear but stringent RWA regulatory guidelines have been established.

Below, the Sa Jie team will provide a detailed analysis.

I. Detailed Explanation of RWA Regulatory Standards

In short, my country's current regulatory approach to RWA can be summarized as follows: allow it only under strict conditions.

It must be noted that Notice 2.6 is the first time that my country has clearly defined RWA at the level of a normative document: "Real-world asset tokenization refers to the activity of using cryptographic technology and distributed ledger or similar technology to convert the ownership, income rights, etc. of assets into tokens or other rights and bond certificates with token characteristics, and to issue and trade them."

Regarding regulatory principles, Article 2.6 of the Notice (13) clearly states: "Without the consent of relevant departments in accordance with laws and regulations, domestic entities and their controlled overseas entities shall not issue virtual currencies overseas." This statement not only restricts RWA, but also restricts ICO behavior in a broad sense. However, whether NFTs are prohibited is worth further discussion. From the perspective of textual interpretation, the Sa Jie team tends to believe that this article does not regulate the issuance of NFTs.

Regarding specific regulatory norms, my country has clearly established an "approval system for RWA issuance." The Sa Jie team has summarized this briefly as follows:

Back in 2025, when the RWA concept was at its peak, the Sa Jie team had already repeatedly and clearly warned that regardless of the method (e.g., using NFTs to disguise RWA), scale (e.g., internally targeted small-scale RWA issuance), or underlying asset (e.g., using agricultural products to issue RWA), issuing RWA in my country is difficult to separate from the ICO activities prohibited by the September 4, 2017 announcement, has poor compliance, and may cross legal red lines. Article 2.6 of the notice affirms this: "Conducting real-world asset tokenization activities within the territory, as well as providing related intermediary and information technology services, which are suspected of illegally issuing tokens, unauthorized public offerings of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures businesses, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out based on specific financial infrastructure with the consent of the competent business authorities in accordance with laws and regulations."

Some partners are optimistic about the exception to the provision regarding domestic issuance: "Except for relevant business activities carried out with the consent of the competent business authority in accordance with laws and regulations, relying on specific financial infrastructure." In this opinion, the Sa Jie team believes that in the short term (within a few years), Chinese regulatory authorities will not allow domestic entities to issue RWA projects. It is expected that only after a considerable number of overseas projects have been tested and Chinese regulatory authorities have accumulated certain regulatory experience will it be possible to truly turn this provision into a feasible path.

Regarding the questions that our partners are generally concerned about, such as what constitutes a "foreign entity controlled by a domestic entity," the specific issuance conditions, and the responsibilities of intermediaries, our team will provide detailed explanations in subsequent articles on RWA compliance issuance.

II. What important "patches" did Notice 2.6 make in the regulation of virtual currencies?

Regarding the nature of virtual currencies, the prohibition of related businesses in mainland China, and judicial policies (violations of public order and good morals are invalid, and risks are borne by the user), the 2.6 notice is no different from the 9.24 notice, so the Sa Jie team will not repeat it here. Today, we will only focus on analyzing the important new "patches" in the 2.6 notice.

(i) No stablecoins in RMB may be issued without permission.

Article 2.6, Paragraph 3 of Notice (I) stipulates: "Stablecoins pegged to legal tender effectively perform some of the functions of legal tender in circulation and use. Without the consent of relevant departments in accordance with laws and regulations, no entity or individual, whether domestic or foreign, may issue stablecoins pegged to RMB overseas."

The direct cause of this patch is the Stablecoin Ordinance enacted and promulgated in Hong Kong in 2025, which caused the concept of stablecoins to suddenly become extremely popular. Some criminals began to issue worthless cryptocurrencies in mainland my country and Hong Kong under the guise of stablecoins, or even "RMB stablecoins," seriously disrupting the financial order.

A deeper reason is that my country's regulatory agencies must safeguard the right to issue currency (or "economic sovereignty") and strictly prevent virtual currencies from impacting my country's economic security. The right to issue currency, intuitively explained, is "the exclusive power owned and exercised by a specific entity (the state or government) to mint, issue, and manage legal tender." A more academic and abstract explanation is "the difference between the face value of currency and its production cost." The Sa Jie team will not elaborate further on this.

In practice, the right to mint coins has played different "roles" in different historical periods: in ancient times, the right to mint coins directly reflected the king's profits (it is generally believed that currency originated from the establishment of state power and the need for taxation); in modern times, the right to mint coins is a fiscal tool of the government; and under the modern financial discourse system, the right to mint coins has gradually transformed into a more complex power game between different countries or different economies.

This explains why the first sentence of Article (I) Paragraph 3 of Notice 2.6 explicitly states: "Stablecoins pegged to legal tender effectively perform some of the functions of legal tender in circulation..." Therefore, the Sa Jie team believes that, given the widespread promotion of the digital yuan in my country, Notice 2.6 essentially eliminates the possibility of any entity issuing RMB stablecoins in compliance with regulations. Partners should not harbor unrealistic illusions about the exception of "with the consent of relevant departments in accordance with laws and regulations."

(ii) New monitoring and reporting obligations for Internet companies

2.6 Notice (vii) stipulates: "Strengthen the management of Internet information content and access. Internet companies shall not provide services such as online business venues, commercial displays, marketing and promotion, and paid traffic redirection for business activities related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets. They shall promptly report any clues of illegal or irregular issues to the relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and investigative work."

This regulation further burdens internet platform operators and service providers, who are already facing numerous constraints. In fact, based on the practical experience of the Sa Jie team, a significant number of cryptocurrency dealers, overseas project teams, and cryptocurrency KOLs currently promote cryptocurrency projects and services through internet platforms and social media groups. For example, certain online platforms and QQ groups are among the largest "traffic hubs," and many victims of cryptocurrency theft and fraud learned about cryptocurrency-related "services" through these platforms.

After being lured to overseas social media platforms by the "project," they ultimately suffered financial losses.

It is foreseeable that after the issuance of Notice 2.6, major internet companies will urgently launch another round of self-inspection and rectification activities. It is worth noting that to implement the requirements of Notice 2.6, internet platforms cannot simply delete relevant content as in previous rectification efforts. Instead, they should assess and organize the relevant content, provide the "clues" to the relevant departments (cybersecurity and information technology authorities, telecommunications regulatory authorities, public security departments, or financial regulatory authorities), and provide technical support and assistance (if any) for the subsequent investigations and investigative work of the relevant departments.

Of course, it seems that major internet platforms are not yet able to effectively implement this obligation, since my country does not currently have a specific agency dedicated to handling risks related to virtual currencies.

According to the requirements of Notice 2.6, this special agency should be established under the leadership of the local financial management department, and should carry out its work on the basis of "participation of telecommunications authorities, public security, market supervision and other departments, and coordination with the cyberspace administration, people's courts and people's procuratorates". At present, local financial management departments still need time to formulate management plans and clarify internal responsibilities, and the relevant work may be difficult to complete in the short term.

In conclusion

In terms of content, Notice 2.6 is not a completely independent normative document. It has a traditional aspect: it re-examines the basic regulatory approach of Notice 9.24 and continues to supplement and improve upon the original norms. However, it also has an innovative aspect: it incorporates RWA, which was not yet in the regulatory purview in 2021 but became a hot topic in 2025, into the regulatory norms and introduces regulatory norms with certain operability.

This means that my country's regulatory authorities are gaining a deeper understanding of virtual assets and are gradually beginning to accept this new phenomenon based on understanding, experimentation, and observation. Although the progress of this process has been extremely slow due to a series of negative events, it is certain that my country's regulatory authorities have seen the potential of virtual assets, which is undoubtedly a major positive for partners in the virtual asset industry.